CVE-2022-4304
Timing Oracle in RSA Decryption
Published:
2/8/2023
Last updated:
5/1/2025
Reserved:
12/6/2022
A timing based side channel exists in the OpenSSL RSA Decryption implementation
which could be sufficient to recover a plaintext across a network in a
Bleichenbacher style attack. To achieve a successful decryption an attacker
would have to be able to send a very large number of trial messages for
decryption. The vulnerability affects all RSA padding modes: PKCS#1 v1.5,
RSA-OEAP and RSASVE.
For example, in a TLS connection, RSA is commonly used by a client to send an
encrypted pre-master secret to the server. An attacker that had observed a
genuine connection between a client and a server could use this flaw to send
trial messages to the server and record the time taken to process them. After a
sufficiently large number of messages the attacker could recover the pre-master
secret used for the original connection and thus be able to decrypt the
application data sent over that connection.
CNA assigner:
openssl (3a12439a-ef3a-4c79-92e6-6081a721f1e5)
Requested by:
n/a
Products affected (1)
Product |
Vendor |
Version |
OpenSSL |
OpenSSL
|
MSM8209
|
Credits (3)
-
1
Hubert Kario from RedHat
-
5
Dmitry Belyavsky from RedHat
-
5
Hubert Kario from RedHat