In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: md: suspend array while updating raid_disks via sysfs In raid1_reshape(), freeze_array() is called before modifying the r1bio memory pool (conf->r1bio_pool) and conf->raid_disks, and unfreeze_array() is called after the update is completed. However, freeze_array() only waits until nr_sync_pending and (nr_pending - nr_queued) of all buckets reaches zero. When an I/O error occurs, nr_queued is increased and the corresponding r1bio is queued to either retry_list or bio_end_io_list. As a result, freeze_array() may unblock before these r1bios are released. This can lead to a situation where conf->raid_disks and the mempool have already been updated while queued r1bios, allocated with the old raid_disks value, are later released. Consequently, free_r1bio() may access memory out of bounds in put_all_bios() and release r1bios of the wrong size to the new mempool, potentially causing issues with the mempool as well. Since only normal I/O might increase nr_queued while an I/O error occurs, suspending the array avoids this issue. Note: Updating raid_disks via ioctl SET_ARRAY_INFO already suspends the array. Therefore, we suspend the array when updating raid_disks via sysfs to avoid this issue too.